Haiti Report, May 26, 2025
A compilation of news about Haiti from the past week.
Massacre in Artibonite: Dozens of Peasants Killed in Préval
Dozens of peasants were executed in Préval, a locality in the first communal section of Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, in the afternoon of Tuesday, May 20, 2025, by La Coalition, an armed self-defense group that emerged in Jean-Denis, originally formed to counter the Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs from neighboring areas. The Coalition has existed for over six years. In its early days, it was closely connected to the population and enjoyed support from members of the diaspora from the region who helped fund it. Even the Haitian National Police and the justice system made use of the Coalition's services, according to information collected by journalists on site. “The preliminary death toll of bodies already found and the severely injured exceeds fifty victims,” said jurist Pierre Estilus of the human rights organization Mouvman Moun, who specified that “almost all of the people killed were hacked with machetes, beheaded, then piled up or thrown into the Artibonite River.” This bloody tragedy followed the death of young Hudlet Charles, a member of the Coalition, who was murdered on his plantation by bandits from the Gran Grif gang of Savien, who claimed responsibility for the killing. “In a fit of rage, the Coalition did not go to Savien for revenge, but instead chose to terrorize the inhabitants of Préval,” according to statements by journalist Bertide Horace.
A reliable police source told Le Nouvelliste that “the perpetrators of these criminal acts set fire to at least fifteen houses and mills belonging to the farmers of Préval.” Referring to a voice message that went viral on social media, which glorified the violence and suggested that “the families of the victims take legal action against the self-identified perpetrators,” the police source recounted the events. At the premises of the Maranatha Baptist Church of the Union of Evangelical Baptist Mission of Haiti (UEBH), a landmark and spiritual cornerstone of the area, Pastor Jacques Brutus, known as Pa Billy, aged 86, and about fifteen other Protestant brothers and sisters present during the attack, “met the same cruel fate of beheading within the religious sanctuary,” according to several sources reporting that “blood is everywhere in Préval.”
National Police raid Kraze Baryè gang stronghold in Pernier, several bandits killed
The Haitian National Police (PNH) conducted a major operation on Thursday, May 22 and Friday, May 23, 2025, in Pernier, in the commune of Pétion-Ville (east of the capital), the stronghold of the actively sought gang leader Vitelhomme Innocent, leader of the criminal group Kraze Baryè. According to police authorities, several armed members of the gang were killed during violent clashes, marked by lengthy exchanges of fire with the police. The operation, carried out by specialized units of the PNH – including the Drone Unit – resulted in the seizure of several firearms, ammunition and various equipment: nearly twenty radio communications devices, large-caliber magazines (Galil, M4, Kalashnikov), an M-1 rifle, ammunition of different calibers, a gas mask, an electric drill, a screen printing device, among others. Mystical objects were also discovered in a peristyle where Vitelhomme Innocent is said to have performed rituals, according to the PNH.
Testimonies gathered on site report the use of drones armed with explosives by the police, while detonations of heavy weapons were audible as far away as the Frères area, near Pernier. The PNH affirms its determination to pursue armed gangs that threaten the civilian population and to regain control of areas that have fallen under criminal control. Despite its proximity to the National Police Academy, the town of Pernier has, for several years, been under the control of the Kraze Baryè gang , which was integrated into the Viv Ansanm criminal coalition in 2023. In the absence of a structural response from the State, this group imposes its law on the population: extortion, kidnappings and forced displacement punctuate the daily lives of the inhabitants.
https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31747
Police strike hard against gangs
Haitian police conducted a forceful operation in Martissant on Sunday, May 25, 2025, using explosive drones. According to initial reports, several bandits were killed. The aircraft targeted the Village-de-Dieu neighborhood, considered a strategic stronghold for several armed groups. According to a reliable source, several people were also injured. Meanwhile, in recent days, many criminals injured during clashes with law enforcement or drone attacks in the city center have been treated at Diquini hospital in the commune of Carrefour. This intensification of operations aims to weaken the influence of gangs in the metropolitan area. The authorities are thus seeking to reduce the capacity of these armed groups, which now control more than 85% of the capital. https://x.com/rtvgalaxie/status/1926775678550024200
Mapping Conflict: Haiti on the Verge of Gang Takeover
Haiti is facing its worst crisis in decades – a perfect storm of gang violence and political drift. Since July 2021, more than a million people have been displaced and around 15,000 have been killed. This new episode of “Mapping Conflict” features Diego Da Rin, Crisis Group’s Haiti Analyst. He explains how the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 deepened a protracted security crisis, how the gangs have been able to expand their control over the capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions since early 2024 – when they joined an alliance known as Viv Ansanm – and how close they are to overthrowing the transitional government. In this video series, Crisis Group experts use satellite imagery to examine developments in local and regional conflicts. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/caribbean/haiti/mapping-conflict-haiti-verge-gang-takeover
Blackout: The Péligre hydroelectric power plant has been completely shut down since May 13
Haitian Electricity (EDH) confirmed in a press release that the Péligre Hydroelectric Power Plant, one of the country's main energy sources, has been completely shut down since Tuesday, May 13. This critical situation has plunged several areas that were previously still powered by hydroelectric power into complete darkness. The institution denounced a "heinous act," which was the cause of this interruption of service. However, no organization or group has formally claimed responsibility for this act of sabotage, leaving room for confusion in a national context already marked by security and institutional instability. The EDH also warns of the serious consequences of these interruptions on its operations. Operating equipment, often imported, is expensive, difficult to repair, and even more difficult to replace in a country facing severe logistical and financial constraints.
These interruptions only exacerbate the national energy insecurity. As the population of the Central Plateau, like other regions dependent on Péligre, finds itself without electricity, EDH calls on the competent authorities to act quickly. It demands:
The opening of a formal investigation to identify, judge and punish those responsible;
The urgent security of the Péligre Power Plant, described as a “national heritage” and a “strategic structure for the Haitian state.”
The institution reiterates its desire to resume service as soon as safety conditions allow its employees and technicians to return to the site. Finally, EDH calls for collective responsibility and solidarity from the population in the protection of public equipment , stressing that such acts penalize all citizens, already severely affected by a chronic energy crisis. https://rezonodwes.com/?p=357474
Péligre Plant Shutdown Could Trigger Flooding
The forced shutdown of the Péligre hydroelectric plant—the country’s largest electricity production center and biggest water reservoir—is having serious consequences for surrounding areas that rely on this infrastructure for irrigation and electricity generation. “If the water from the Péligre dam is not properly released, it could overflow and cause flooding—even in the Dominican Republic—which could lead to another source of conflict between the two neighboring countries,” stated agronomist Jean André Victor, former director of the Artibonite Valley Development Organization (ODVA), on Magik 9, this Wednesday, May 21, 2025. According to Victor, those behind the shutdown appear to have recognized the risk of flooding across the border and decided to urgently release the stored water. However, such an action will affect major infrastructure and irrigation systems on one hand, and may cause downstream flooding on the other, Victor pointed out. the Péligre dam is part of an interconnected system. On one hand, it stores rainwater and manages floods; on the other hand, the Cannot dam is used to distribute irrigation water. The latter is currently under the control of armed gangs, as it is located between Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Verrettes. As a result, these armed groups also control the water distribution system, which includes internal electronic infrastructure. “If these facilities are damaged, it could take around 10 years to rebuild them.” https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256398/peligre-plant-shutdown-could-trigger-flooding-agronomist-warns
New alert on the growing influence of gangs in Furcy
Worrying alerts are multiplying this Sunday, May 11, 2025, on the continued action and possible installation of armed gangs in several areas of Furcy, commune of Kenscoff (east of Port-au-Prince). Residents report that parts of Furcy are now under the control of armed groups. Several houses near Furcy Square have reportedly been occupied, while the church has been broken into and its furnishings removed. The religious school, the presbytery, as well as numerous residences and other establishments, are said to be under threat. Sporadic gunfire continues to be heard throughout the region, particularly in Fermathe and Thomassin, fueling a climate of panic and insecurity. The Haitian National Police (PNH) announced that it has regained control of the Furcy sub-police station, which was attacked during the night of Thursday, May 8, to Friday, May 9, 2025, by armed elements of the criminal coalition known as Viv Ansanm. An official statement from the PNH states that the rapid intervention of specialized units made it possible to repel the attackers and install a significant security presence.
However, many residents remain skeptical. They denounce the authorities' inaction, despite having been informed, they say, for two weeks about the gangs' intentions in this strategic area leading to the capital. Suspicions of complicity between certain state actors and criminal groups are also expressed. "I don't understand this charade that is being played out before our eyes and that disregards the many lives and property at risk in this region," complains an educator from Fermathe. Since January 2025, the commune of Kenscoff has faced a gradual increase in violence, with more than 260 deaths and more than 3,000 internally displaced people, according to UN figures. In early May, the National Police announced that it had killed more than 20 members of the Viv Ansanm gang as part of an operation aimed at dismantling their strongholds. But public confidence remains fragile, shaken by the scale of the ongoing violence and doubts about the real political will to regain control. The residents of Furcy are calling with all their might for a strengthened and urgent response from the Haitian state to restore security in the region.
https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31691
Call for urgent action at OAS Haiti Symposium in DC
The Organization of American States came under pressure Thursday to help quash gang violence in Haiti as a U.N.-backed mission led by Kenyan police in the troubled Caribbean country struggles with a lack of funds and personnel. A U.S. Department of State official attending an OAS meeting on Haiti’s security crisis said that the Washington-based group has a critical role to play in the nation. “Much more can and should be done,” said Barbara Feinstein, deputy assistant secretary for Caribbean Affairs and Haiti at the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Feinstein echoed comments made by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a House Appropriations Committee hearing on Haiti.
“Why do we have an OAS, if the OAS can’t put together a mission to handle the most critical region in our hemisphere?” Rubio said Wednesday as he proposed building a mission with regional partners. “We’re grateful to the Kenyans, but this is a regional problem, and it should have a regional solution.”
OAS Secretary-General Luis Almagro on Thursday acknowledged that the Kenya-led mission was struggling and said that the organization was working on new initiatives “There is a need for a new structure for the mission,” he said. Last year, the U.S. and Haiti called for it to be replaced with a U.N. peacekeeping mission, but the U.N. Security Council hasn’t supported such a change.
US Lawmakers want mandatory sanctions, reporting on Haiti as gang violence worsens
The Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act of 2025 was filed in the Senate on Thursday amid growing concerns about Haiti’s escalating security crisis, which is fueling horrific crimes, including rape, murders and kidnapping. The violence has led to 5.7 million people — more than half the country’s population — struggling to find food to eat and more than 1 million people being internally displaced. Previously introduced, the bill was reintroduced in the Senate by New Hampshire Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and co-signed by Sens. Rick Scott, R-Florida, Tim Kaine, D-Virginia, John Curtis, R-Utah, and Chris Coons, D-Connecticut. A House version of the bill was introduced and passed out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee last month. It was led by ranking Democrat Gregory Meeks of New York.
“This bipartisan bill is a meaningful and logical next step towards addressing and preventing criminal collusion and violence in Haiti,” said Shaheen. The ongoing gang violence has is creating a dire humanitarian catastrophe mere hundreds of miles from U.S. shores, she said, adding that the measures laid out in the legislation “will ensure the U.S. is properly equipped to protect our national security interests and ensure stability and security in the region.” Scott said Haitians have “suffered for too long at the hands of violent gangs and corrupt elites who put their own power over their people.
“This bill will shine a light on the collusion between criminals and those in power, makes clear that the United States will not stand for this violence and prioritizes our national security interests in the region,” he said. Under the legislation, the State Department’s sanction authorities would now be mandatory rather than discretionary. The bill also requires that the interagency prioritize resources to sanction such individuals. The State Department, in coordination with other federal agencies and the intelligence community, would also be required to provide Congress with an explicit list of all known gang leaders and political and economic elites who have direct and significant ties to gang networks. If the legislation passes, the State Department would also be required to provide an assessment of threats to U.S. national interests and democratic governance in the country. The bill does not include specific funding for implementation, but it’s expected that the State would dedicate additional resources. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article306976306.html#storylink=cpy
US will not punish humanitarian-aid groups in Haiti forced to pay gang tolls
The Trump administration has no intention of punishing humanitarian-aid groups that are forced to pay gang-enforced tolls in order to provide aid to Haitians who have been victimized by the ongoing violence, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress on Wednesday. Earlier this month, the Trump administration designated Haiti’s major gangs as foreign and global terrorists, and warned that anyone providing “material support” risks being penalized and criminally charged. The warning has created and fear in Haiti, where little gets through without going through armed gangs, now in control of up to 90% of metropolitan Port-au-Prince and parts of the Artibonite region and Central Plateau.
“We are concerned that humanitarian groups, in order to distribute humanitarian aid, are often charged, for lack of a better term, ‘tolls.’ You gotta pay the money to let them go,” Rubio said during his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday in response to a question about Haiti. “Will that make them subject to sanctions because they paid somebody money to let them go through? That is not the intent of these sanctions and we don’t intend to punish them.” Rubio said he feels “passionately about” the situation in Haiti, and used Cherfilus-McCormick’s questions as an opportunity to offer the first public insight into his thinking on what the U.S. policy should be, including changing the international armed mission’s current mandate, which requires them to be defensive in posture and limits the abilities of its 1,000 security personnel in taking on the armed gangs.
The gang members “have to be eliminated, put in jail... you’ve got to get rid of them. As long as they’re around, you won’t be able to have stability in the country,” he said. The Kenya force, he added, has “complaints about some of the equipment they’ve been provided. So it’s a combination of not having a force posture, not having the legal authority, and not having the appropriate equipment they claim to be able to conduct some of these missions.” Rubio also doubled down on the idea that the Organization of American States should take over leadership of effort against the gangs from Kenya’s Multinational Security Support mission. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article306909566.html#storylink=cpy
12 Injured Following Incident with BSAP Agents in Cayes-Jacmel
Twelve people, including four BSAP agents, were injured on Friday, May 16, in Raymond-les-Bains (Cayes-Jacmel), during an altercation between a motorcyclist and BSAP agents who were providing security for a school parade. The victims were transported to Saint-Michel Hospital. According to local authorities, the lives of some of the victims are at risk. According to testimonies collected by Magik 9, a motorcyclist tried to cross the crowd. Intercepted by a BSAP agent responsible for securing the parade, the altercation quickly escalated. "The agent used a 12-gauge shotgun. Several people, including parents of students, local residents, and motorcycle taxi drivers, were injured. They were taken to Saint-Michel Hospital in Jacmel, where some are in critical condition," said Enante Barthélemy, interim executive agent of the commune, specifying that the school had neither requested nor received authorization from the mayor's office or the police to organize this event. Peter Coles, the Southeastern departmental coordinator of the BSAP, confirmed the deployment of eight agents to ensure the security of the parade at the request of the school. However, he rejected the notion that agents fired on the crowd. "Those who were initially deployed were not armed. It was a reinforcement, called urgently, that fired into the air with a 12-gauge shotgun to disperse the crowd," he explained. Mr. Coles added that some individuals in the crowd were themselves armed, contributing to the confusion. Four BSAP agents were also injured during the altercation, but their lives are not at risk, he specified.
The situation remains tense in the commune. Residents are expressing their anger and fear of escalation. In response to this threat, the mayor's office has taken several preventive measures. "Three UDMO units are now patrolling the commune, particularly in Raymond-les-Bains. I also submitted a request to the BSAP for them to leave the area," said Enante Barthélemy. She also reported that the director of the school involved, who was summoned to the mayor's office, communicated through his lawyer that he did not feel safe and therefore could not appear. Originally created to ensure the protection of protected areas, the BSAP is now accused of mission drift in Cayes-Jacmel. "They are replacing other institutions: they control traffic, intervene everywhere, without authorization or coordination. They operate without oversight," lamented the mayor. She called on the State to clarify their role. "This is not the first time they have been involved in serious incidents. We welcomed them with open arms to protect our natural resources, but today, they are everywhere except in the areas that need protection," she added. https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256255/12-injured-following-incident-with-bsap-agents-in-cayes-jacmel
Internally Displaced People: Forgotten Victims of the Haitian Crisis
On the morning of Thursday, May 15, the day began like any other for the displaced people who found refuge in the former premises of the Fusion party in Bourdon. Since they were forced to leave their homes, their daily life has been far from peaceful. At the entrance of this shelter, two makeshift showers, without doors or curtains for privacy, welcome those who frequent the site. Wastewater from the showers is directly discharged into the street. This camp, located in the former premises of the Fusion party in Bourdon, is a vast cluster of makeshift shelters made of worn-out metal sheets and plastic tarps, through which one has to squeeze to find their way. In this vast open-air camp, 681 families—around 3,400 people—struggle to hold on to life. Their lack of resources is manifold: water for daily use, drinking water, infrastructure, and for some, even a roof to protect them from the weather. In this camp, only one sanitary block with two toilets serves all the residents.
In the neighboring camp, on land owned by KID, the situation is similar. Although water for daily use is somewhat available, those who live on this site are far from happy. In these times, when it rains almost every evening, sleep is a distant memory for the residents. At the camp located at the Office of the Citizen's Protection (OPC), instead of work, more than 1,600 families have occupied the office since November, as is also the case at the République de Colombie School. Among the adults who engage in various activities, hundreds of children—the vast majority of whom are no longer in school, some barefoot—run around everywhere, playing with friends their age. https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256245/internally-displaced-people-forgotten-victims-of-the-haitian-crisis
Le Nouvellsite also did a series of profiles of displaced residents in Port-au-Prince: https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256243/the-reality-of-displacement-profiling-camp-residents-in-haiti
Police Recover Two Bodies and Dismembered Organs in Pernier Home
The judicial police have arrested an individual in a house in Pernier where two corpses were discovered and harvested organs were being stored in containers, Le Nouvelliste learned on Wednesday, May 21, 2024. “The bodies of a man and a woman were found in body bags. The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ) also found organs in containers,” a police source revealed in the late afternoon, as videos of the apprehended individual and the nearly dried-up corpses circulated on social media. The footage also shows severed, desiccated organs preserved in containers. "Evidence points to organ trafficking. But the investigation is ongoing," the source added, declining to provide further details. For several months now, Haitian authorities have denounced the involvement of organ traffickers in fueling violence in Haiti. This narrative was echoed by U.S. Senator Marco Rubio during a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday. https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256401/police-recover-two-bodies-and-dismembered-organs-in-pernier-home
Minister of Economy and Finance presents plans for the North and the South
Minister Alfred Fils Metellus, spoke as part of the Wednesday Reflection of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). He cited several reasons for the government's decision to finance the economic growth of the northern and southern departments. First, there is a strong centralization of the economy around Port-au-Prince, where 60 to 70% of investments are traditionally directed. Then there are the socioeconomic and security crises that have been plaguing the capital for some time. "We need to rebalance; a territorial approach to recovery is essential. It is, in fact, a solution to regional imbalances, migratory pressure, and the weakening of local economic capacity," argued Alfred Fils Metellus. Above all, the Minister argued that the northern and southern departments have underexploited potential. It identified opportunities in transport and connectivity infrastructure (airports, ports), productive and incentive infrastructure (free zones, industrial parks), agriculture, and tourism. "The North represents 20% of national production (cocoa, coffee, bananas, etc.) and more than 70% of the world's vetiver supply comes from the southern department (highly prized by the cosmetics industry)," reads the document presented by the MEF.
"It is not enough to have potential; you need the means to exploit it," said Minister Alfred Fils Metellus before highlighting the challenges to be overcome in order to exploit the potential expressed in the two departments. A lack of basic infrastructure: secondary roads, irrigation, electricity; - limited budgetary resources, despite approximately 25% of the population living there; - weak institutional presence; - limited local technical capacity; - increasing climate vulnerability are, among others, the obstacles identified to the economic development of the said geographical departments in question. In his speech, the minister outlined the efforts made to rebalance the budget. "Previously, 60 to 70% of investments were made in Port-au-Prince. Between 2018 and 2023, investment spending represented 5-7% in the South and 6-8% in the North. Now, the 2024-2025 revised budget marks a shift toward territorial equity. There are visible, useful, territorial investments, such as the 500 million gourdes allocated for the Antoine Simon airport in Les Cayes and 200 million gourdes for the construction of road axes (Côte-de-Fer, Cap airport, St-Raphael, Pignon-La Victoire-Bois de Laurence, etc.) in the North," the minister argued.
For the targeted partnerships pillar, the MEF intends to opt for a public-private partnership as a lever for impact in several areas: tourism, hospitality and entertainment services, and agribusiness. To amplify the impact, it is targeting international cooperation as a strategy to reach other areas such as modern urban infrastructure, agriculture and economic transformation, climate resilience and risk management, air connectivity, etc.
Preliminary Draft of New Constitution Formally Presented
In the presence of executive officials, including members of the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, members of his cabinet, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Maria Isabel Salvador, and the Permanent Representative of the UNDP in Haiti, among others, the official handover ceremony for the draft of the new Haitian Constitution was held this Wednesday, May 21, 2025, at the Villa d’Accueil. For the CPT, this event marks a symbolic and decisive step in the institutional restructuring process aimed at restoring democratic and republican stability in the country. The draft constitution was presented to the president of the Transitional Presidential Council, Fritz Alphonse Jean. Developed by the Steering Committee of the National Conference in accordance with its assigned mission, this initiative, according to the CPT spokesperson, reflects the Council's strong determination to equip the country with the legal instruments necessary to lead the nation toward a referendum that will ratify the final version of the Constitution.
“This represents a crucial step toward the organization of fair and credible elections at all levels, in order to restore the sovereign institutions of the Republic,” declared Jacques Amboise at the beginning of the document handover ceremony. Presidential advisor Frinel Joseph, who oversees elections and constitutional reform at the CPT, stated that this is a decisive milestone in the country’s reconstruction process marked by the submission of the constitutional draft.
https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256384/preliminary-draft-of-new-constitution-formally-presented
New Departmental Director of Police in Central Plateau Amidst Anti-Gang Activities
The General Directorate of the Haitian National Police (PNH) proceeded, on Tuesday, May 20, 2025, to the installation of Divisional Commissioner Mackenzie Jacques as head of the Departmental Directorate of the Center of the Haitian National Police. After only four months at the helm of the PNH's Central Departmental Directorate, Divisional Commissioner Delin Boyer has been replaced. He is handing over his position to Mackenzie Jacques, who, prior to this appointment, was in charge of the Temporary Anti-Gang Unit (UTAG).
This change comes just hours after operations by specialized anti-gang units in Mirebalais resulted in six fatally wounded bandits, including Douby Gilbert, 44, alias Chalè, and three weapons seized. The attacks, which began early in the morning, continued until sunset, according to a source close to the police in Mirebalais. The departmental authorities have not specified the reasons for this change in the departmental leadership as operations progress in Mirebalais. "I can tell you that a new head has been appointed to provide a proportionate response to the bandit attacks in Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau," this source told us, stressing that he was unaware of whether the outgoing commissioner was under investigation in connection with the recent events. Recovering the lost territories of the Centre department, combating gangs and juvenile delinquency linked to banditry to the utmost severity, supporting the population of the Centre, specifically that of Mirebalais in its demands and restoring confidence in the police force constitute the main priorities of the new DDC-PNH.
UN denounces deportation of pregnant women from Dominican Republic to Haiti
The UN on Tuesday, May 20, condemned the expulsion within a month, "in violation of international standards," of hundreds of pregnant or breastfeeding women from the Dominican Republic to Haiti, which is ravaged by gang violence. On average, 30 pregnant or breastfeeding women are expelled from the Dominican Republic every day. This is what the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Haitian authorities have observed at two border posts over the past month. The Dominican President Luis Abinader has made combating Haitian immigration one of his priorities. In early April, he took fifteen measures to strengthen controls. For example, authorities now request the papers of any foreigner who comes to a hospital for treatment. Those without a residence permit are expelled.
In total, nearly 20,000 people, including "an increasing number of highly vulnerable women, “were returned from the Dominican Republic to Haiti in April via the land border, a record for a one-month period," according to the IOM. This tightening of immigration policy is giving rise to abuses. The Spanish newspaper El Pais reported this week accounts of Haitian women being raped by immigration officers to avoid deportation. The UN also calls for "migration policies that respect human dignity" and "greater regional solidarity to address a crisis that transcends borders and endangers the rights and lives of thousands of people.”
Haitian women raped to avoid deportation and children forced to leave school
As soon as she hears the Immigration bus arrive, Ruth hides her young children as best she can and lies down on the bed. She already knows what they’re going to do to her. Rape — she can’t remember how many times it has happened to her — is the irreplaceable bargaining chip that keeps immigration agents from deporting her back to Haiti. She left her home country due to violence and extreme poverty five years ago. Sometimes, she urinates just upon hearing the engine. Other times, she “lets it happen quickly.” Anything is better than returning to her country. Ruth — not her real name — anonymously shares her testimony with EL PAÍS in a tiny room made of wood and sheet metal. She lives in the humble neighborhood of Kosovo, 15 minutes from the luxury hotels and subdevelopments of Punta Cana that, each year, open their doors to millions of tourists in search of all-inclusive resorts near the sea. This paradise in the Dominican Republic is partly sustained by those who are currently being persecuted and violated. Ruth’s irregular status means that she can’t report the immigration agents who raped her to the police, nor does she dare go to a hospital to rule out sexually transmitted diseases. “I’m fed up with them coming,” she laments, her eyes exhausted, while scrubbing her children’s clothes in a bucket of soap and water.
Since the administration of President Luis Abinader announced a tightening of the Dominican Republic’s immigration policy in early-April, a large portion of the undocumented population has opted to hide at home and go out as little as possible. Currently, public hospitals and construction sites have become routine stops for the massive raids that — in the first 12 days of April alone — deported 14,874 people. In 2024, the total number of people deported from the Dominican Republic was 276,215.
It’s no secret to any Dominican that both the precarious sectors are largely staffed by undocumented workers. In the country, nearly 80% of those working in construction are of Haitian origin, while practically 60% of them work informally. That’s why the president of the Dominican Confederation of Micro, Small and Medium Construction Enterprises (COPYMECON) — Eliseo Cristopher — has called for regularization of their status. “If we don’t have Haitian labor, the construction sector will definitely come to a standstill,” he warns. The minister of Agriculture, meanwhile, acknowledged that deportations were seriously affecting the banana, coffee and livestock sectors.
Inactive Parliament to Drain 3.5 Billion Gourdes from Public Funds
Dysfunctional for nearly five years, the Haitian Parliament has already cost the public treasury more than 10 billion gourdes. Its budget allocation for the 2024–2025 fiscal year is 3.5 billion gourdes (over $25 million), of which 3.4 billion covers personnel expenses for nearly 4,000 employees. A significant portion of these employees receive their salaries by bank transfer, while others pick up their checks at a cramped office in Delmas, Le Nouvelliste has learned. “If no action is taken by September, the Haitian Parliament, which has been dysfunctional for nearly five years, will cost the treasury 3 billion 591 million gourdes,” a source at the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) told Le Nouvelliste on Thursday, May 22, 2025. The dysfunctional Parliament has already consumed over 10 billion gourdes. In the 2022–2023 fiscal year, the Parliament's budget was 4.7 billion gourdes. For the 2023–2024 fiscal year, it was 3 billion 761 million gourdes. Meanwhile, in Haiti, customs revenues are breaking records, and the state continues to spend without pursuing efficiency or seeking resources to finance its security needs and social assistance programs—despite the fact that many taxpayers, driven from their businesses and survival-based commerce by gangs, now find themselves crammed into displacement camps.
Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti
International measures—from the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to recent U.S. terrorist designations for specific gangs—have failed to prevent an already catastrophic humanitarian disaster from worsening. While the crisis has many roots, arms trafficking and illicit financial flows in particular have driven the latest explosion of violence. The question now is whether Haitians, their neighbors, and the international community can muster the courage to block them in the months ahead.
Haiti now has the world’s highest murder rate, and increasing numbers of people are being displaced as gangs compete to seize territory. Haiti recorded 5,600 gang-related killings last year, and 1,600 in the first three months of 2025. Attacks are getting more brazen. In late March, coordinated strikes on the Carrefour and Pétion-Ville neighborhoods killed 115 and displaced more than 3,000. Sexual violence and child recruitment are now common tactics used by gangs to subjugate entire neighborhoods.
The continued influx of illegal firearms and ammunition, predominantly from the U.S., is a key driver of violence. Despite efforts to slow arms trafficking and seize weapons, including in ports in Miami, Santo Domingo, and Port-au-Prince, it continues virtually unabated. A UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) analysis confirms that approximately 70% of weapons recovered in Haitian operations originate from U.S.-licensed dealers, with some also trafficked through other Caribbean islands. In the U.S., local brokers usually acquire arms legally via “straw man” purchasers and use couriers to transport them through Haitian and Dominican intermediaries. Meanwhile, private security companies such as Black Mountain Solutions, GardaWorld, G4S, and Professional Security Services are reportedly expanding their operations to protect those who can afford to pay, with little regulatory oversight. Some criminal groups reportedly obtain illegal arms from private security companies, and insiders acknowledge that some firms pay local commanders for “safe passage” in gang‐held neighborhoods.
Gang violence in Haiti is not random but rather deliberate and instrumental. Several gang leaders have robust ties to political and business elites within and outside the country. For many criminal groups, sowing chaos is good for business: It disrupts supply chains and causes local prices on goods and services to rise, generating more opportunities to harvest profits. Gang finances are diversified, largely sustained through extortion, roadblocks, kidnapping, and black-market sales of everything from gasoline to rice. Protection rackets and hostage ransoms generate millions in revenue. Some gangsters livestream their exploits and use social media to intimidate their rivals and energize recruits while monetizing clicks and private donations in real time.
https://americasquarterly.org/article/flows-of-guns-and-money-are-dooming-haiti/
Haiti gang leader ‘Yonyon’ found guilty of kidnapping 16 U.S. missionaries
Germine Joly, once one of the most powerful gang leaders in Haiti — even when he was behind prison bars — has been found guilty of kidnapping 16 U.S. citizens who worked in Haiti as missionaries. The missionaries were abducted in 2021, and 12 members of the group from Ohio-based Christian Aid Ministries, including a Canadian national, were held for two months. They won their freedom only after a $350,000 ransom was paid and Joly’s co-gang leader, Lanmo Sanjou, set up their release to look like an escape to avoid his fellow gang member’s wrath. Joly, known as “Yonyon,” took the stand in his defense and refuted any involvement with the 400 Mawozo gang. On Friday he was found guilty by a federal jury in the District of Columbia for his role in orchestrating the hostage taking. Joly was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit hostage taking and 16 counts of hostage taking of a U.S. national for ransom.
The self-described “king” of the notoriously violent Haitian gang known as 400 Mawozo, Joly previously pleaded guilty to his role in a gun trafficking conspiracy that smuggled firearms to Haiti in violation of U.S. export laws and the laundering of the gang’s funds derived from ransoms paid for other U.S. hostage victims. He was sentenced in June to 35 years in federal prison. The 400 Mawozo is part of the powerful Viv Ansanm gang coalition and controls areas in the Croix-des-Bouquets commune to the east of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince. Joly directed the gang’s operations from inside a Haitian prison using unmonitored cell phones and was constantly in touch with other 400 Mawozo leaders, most of whom were his relatives. He controlled the gang’s finances, supplied its weapons and otherwise directed operations.
‘Worst of the worst,’ Miami judge says as Haiti orphanage founder gets 210 years
One by one they spoke of their pain, their nightmares and shame, and the suicidal thoughts. Amid pleas for psychological help and justice, they described how the American founder of their Port-au-Prince orphanage lured them in with promise of an education and a better life. But Michael Karl Geilenfeld, who operated several orphanages and a home for the disabled in Haiti over a span of 30 years, was no “man of God,” the 10 men told a U.S. federal judge inside a Miami court room.
Instead, he was a criminal, a “diabolical psychopath,” who used cookies and trips to the U.S. to steal their childhood as he sexually and physically abused them. Then he used his power, money and the white color of his skin to shut them down when they tried to get help. “This orphanage destroyed my childhood,” a 24-year-old testified on Friday morning about the St. Joseph’s Home for Boys. “There is no amount of love that can make me forget. The only thing that can make me forget is, I have to leave this earth. Only death.” On Friday, after the young man and nine other victims of Geilenfeld detailed the sexual, physical and verbal abuse they endured at his hands — and their lingering trauma, including guilt and shame — U.S. District Judge David Leibowitz sentenced Geilenfeld to 210 years in prison.
Toussaint Publishing House burned down four days before its 13th anniversary
The Toussaint Publishing House (MET), which will celebrate its 13th anniversary in four days , was burned down on rue Séjournée, Delmas 19, during the night of Tuesday, May 20 to Wednesday, May 21, 2025. MET joins the list of businesses that have disappeared from the landscape. Specializing in school books, this company was equipped with a printing press, a design studio, a correction room, offset presses, a warehouse, and a distribution fleet. More than a business, MET was an incubator for Haitian voices: children's storytellers, English teachers, math teachers, trainers of trainers, and budding poets all found their first print runs there. "The Toussaint publishing house is the only one in the industry that can boast of having systematized the teaching of English at the primary level with its English program for children called JEES (Junior English In Elementary School)," recalls Professor Toussaint.
OPINION/ANALYSIS
Designating Haiti’s gangs as terrorists risks humanitarian aid
Opinion By the Miami Herald Editorial Board
The Trump administration’s decision to designate Haiti’s most powerful armed gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists may project strength. Still, it risks triggering a catastrophic humanitarian collapse just as the need for aid intensifies and international support is stretched thin. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the designations last week, targeting the Viv Ansanm coalition, which controls up to 90% of Port-au-Prince, and its ally, the Gran Grif gang in the Artibonite region. These gangs have undeniably unleashed terror: more than 1,600 Haitians were killed in the first three months of 2025, and over five million face acute hunger. But branding them as terrorists is a blunt instrument where a scalpel is needed.
The implications go far beyond symbolism. Under U.S. law, providing “material support” to designated groups becomes a federal crime, a broad definition that can include food, fuel or medical supplies. This could criminalize humanitarian workers who must negotiate access with gangs or pay tolls to deliver aid. Already operating under dangerous conditions, many aid groups may now pull out entirely — tightening the gangs’ grip on neighborhoods and deepening the suffering of those trapped inside them.
Broward U.S. Rep. Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick, co-chair of the Haiti Caucus, warns the move could push Haiti further into isolation. Disrupting remittances and aid — economic lifelines for millions — would devastate a country already teetering on the edge. Haitian families rely on those funds for food, education, and survival.
The gangs’ dominance is not just a law enforcement issue; it’s a symptom of institutional collapse. The Trump administration may view the designation as a show of resolve, but it lacks a strategic endgame, or even a path to prosecuting gang leaders. Without U.S. troops on the ground or a viable Kenyan-led force, what’s the plan to dismantle these armed groups? There’s also a critical deadline looming. In June, the contractor managing the U.S.-constructed base for nearly 1,000 Kenyan-led multinational troops needs assurance that the administration will continue the $200 million in funding. Without a firm commitment before the contract expires in September, the limited mission could withdraw this summer, leaving a dangerous power vacuum. In that case, gangs will operate unchecked, and more than a million displaced Haitians will be left to fend for themselves amid spiraling chaos.
Experts warn the designation could also complicate future peace-building and gang demobilization efforts. It might even be used as justification for deporting Haitians from the U.S., including those tenuously linked to violence. State Rep. Dotie Joseph, a Haitian American leader, cautions that the terrorist label could be weaponized against Haitian immigrants, just as similar labels have been used against others, including Venezuelans targeted over tattoos or clothing. “In practice, I am concerned that the administration may use such a designation as an additional tool to mistreat Haitian immigrants in the U.S.,” Joseph told the Editorial Board.
The administration’s next steps must include clear safeguards, guidance for aid groups and donors, and a strategy focused on weakening gang finances, not humanitarian access. The goal must be to choke off gang resources, not the flow of food and medicine. Labeling gangs as terrorists may play well politically, but the real cost could be paid in lives lost to hunger, disease and violence. Haiti doesn’t need more punitive gestures. It needs protection, support and a coordinated international response. If the Trump administration won’t back the U.N.-authorized Kenyan-led force, there must be a credible Plan B.
Port-au-Prince is on the brink of state collapse. Declaring gangs as terrorists may feel decisive, but it won’t stop the violence, and it could sever the last remaining lifelines for millions.
This is a moment for nuanced diplomacy, not slogans. Haiti needs sustained, strategic engagement and a plan to dismantle the criminal networks Rubio himself says pose a threat to U.S. and regional interests.
Haiti deserves better than an empty gesture dressed up as strategy.
https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article306063001.html#storylink=cpy
Haiti on the edge of collapse: The US must respond now or it will be too late
By Nathalye Cotrino, a senior Americas researcher at Human Rights Watch, in The Hill
Only 10 percent of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, remains under the control of the Haitian government. And even this last stronghold is now on the verge of collapse, putting the entire population at risk.
A religious worker there told me about corpses in the streets, decomposing in broad daylight; women and girls are raped in plain view and children are digging through trash for food. “The smell of burned bodies is unbearable,” he said. “It’s completely devastating.” Over the past few months, criminal groups have conducted attacks — including killings and sexual violence — in areas previously considered safe, as they seek full control of the capital. They have also committed atrocities to tighten their grip on the population in regions already under their control. Thousands have fled with little more than the clothes on their backs.
In my visits to Haiti in recent years, I have documented rape, child recruitment and killings by criminal groups. The violence is growing by the day and is likely to get even worse if criminal groups take full control of Port-au-Prince. U.N. Security Council members, including the U.S., need to stop dragging their feet. They should immediately fund and staff the current international mission, ensuring it has more resources to stabilize Haiti. They should promptly adopt the steps that Secretary General António Guterres has recommended to bolster the Multinational Security forces. Yet even if it ever reaches full deployment, it is doubtful those forces are up to the task. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly said as much in February.
Haiti needs a full U.N. mission, authorized by the Security Council, that can restore basic security and support Haitian efforts to protect the population, deliver humanitarian aid and progressively rebuild political institutions. The transitional government has called for the Security Council to urgently consider “proposals for a significant strengthening of international support for the restoration of security in Haiti.”
The U.S. also bears a responsibility to curb the flow of the weapons fueling Haiti’s violence. Most of the guns used by criminal groups are made in America and smuggled through Florida, where most outgoing packages are never run through an X-ray machine. Strengthening inspections would be a critical step to cutting off weapon supplies.
“Haitians are losing hope; they feel the international community has abandoned them to their own fate,” an international humanitarian worker told me. “Many victims, including children, who come looking for food, ask me, ‘Why is this happening to us? What did we do wrong? Why has the world forgotten us?”
Without American support to bolster the international response, Port-au-Prince’s collapse may be inevitable. The window for an effective international response is rapidly closing — the time for decisive action is now.
Haiti needs us. We must not turn our backs
By Dominique Anglade and Régine Chassagne Special to the Montreal Gazette
The current news cycle is relentless. Still, we are concerned that Haiti’s ongoing crisis no longer makes headlines, consequently relegating it to being an afterthought. Yet, Haiti’s history and legacy continue to profoundly influence the Americas. On May 18, Haiti celebrates not only its flag but also the turning point it represents in the country’s history — one that would lead to its independence and the end of slavery, a seminal moment for Haitians and for people far beyond its borders seeking justice and freedom. Haiti has always been a land of refuge and of dignity for the oppressed, a stronghold for the fight for freedom. From its inception, Haiti supported the fight for independence of several Latin American countries and was a blueprint for many African nations. Haiti’s influence is also deeply embedded in the culture and architecture of New Orleans, for example, shaping North American identity in profound ways — including through its role in the emergence of jazz.
The current crisis stems from many factors: from the crippling, unjust independence debt imposed by France, to climate change, natural disasters and the many irresponsible actions of past Haitian governments and of foreign governments claiming to be allies. Today, in the face of Haiti’s challenges, we cannot stand idly by. The consequences of what is unfolding in Haiti go far beyond its borders. In an interconnected world, what affects one nation concerns us all. Indifference is not an option. We strongly denounce policies that further destabilize Haiti, such as the threat of deporting hundreds of thousands of Haitians who have long been integrated into the United States. Similarly, we condemn any decision by Canada not to welcome those fleeing hardship and distress. Despite the heartbreak that forced them to leave their homeland, these men and women work, build communities, and contribute to the economy. Making them more vulnerable will only deepen the crisis.
Canada has a historic opportunity to contribute to a sustainable solution — one grounded in human rights, international co-operation, and reconstruction. In this unprecedented moment, and following in the footsteps of leaders like Mackenzie King and Lester B. Pearson, we call on the new Canadian government to increase its engagement and show moral leadership within the international coalition that will support Haiti through its next chapter. In this new chapter, security will be restored, and the country’s youth will see their futures shift from dreams to reality. A chapter where Haiti’s economy is revitalized. In this effort, the Canadian government can count on a committed Haitian diaspora, ready to take part in the renewal of their country of origin. We encourage Quebec to join this partnership and fully embrace the spirit of empathy so distinctive to this part of the Americas.
For nearly 15 years, the KANPE Foundation has stood alongside communities in Haiti, witnessing the strength, ingenuity and determination of the Haitian people. We have seen communities thrive when provided with the right tools. We know Haiti’s potential is immense. Despite the crises, its culture and talent continue to shine through music, cuisine, cinema, fashion, painting, entrepreneurship and more.
What do Haitians ask for? Opportunities. What does Haiti need? Solidarity and commitment. The world cannot turn its back on Haiti. Let us not forget that in Haiti, the time to act is now so that Haitians not only survive the current crisis but thrive for generations to come. It is love, collaboration and solidarity, not cynicism, that will lift Haiti up.
We will be there, by Haiti’s side. Always.
https://www.montrealgazette.com/opinion/op-eds/article937988.html#storylink=cpy
Why the United States Can’t Afford to Ignore Haiti’s Collapse: Critical Questions, By Georges Fauriol
Fueled by an open flow of drugs and weapons trafficking, Haiti, as a failed state in the middle of the Caribbean, will undermine U.S. partners in the region. Without a robust policy engagement, the two baseline imperatives that frame U.S. thinking toward Haiti, (a) no U.S. boots on the ground, and (b) Haiti is a regional concern, not just a U.S. one, will become moot as the country implodes into a crisis with wider regional implications. In other words, the crisis in Haiti will not stay in Haiti.
Q1: What’s happening in Haiti now?
A1: 2025 began with the UN secretary general noting that Haiti’s capital could be overrun by criminal gangs if the international community did not step up aid to the security mission there. Since then, Haiti’s gangs have killed thousands of people, are increasingly operating as coalitions, and have widened the scope and scale of operations beyond Port-au-Prince. Despite being put in place with the support of the United States and others in April 2024, these developments have further exposed a very fragile transitional governance structure, splintered in part by corruption accusations. More than 1 million Haitians are now internally displaced, representing a 48 percent increase since just September 2024. By May 2025, assessments of Haiti’s reality draw attention to an understaffed and underfunded Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in danger of collapsing, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and a lack of clarity in U.S. policy. The dilemma of U.S. policy may be that Haiti is viewed as a problem—not an opportunity—and therefore has not triggered the needed engagement for an administration preferring a transactional foreign policy.
Q2: What is the current U.S.-Haiti policy?
A2: U.S. policy is uneasily anchored to the maintenance of the current MSS led by Kenya, which was originally deployed to reenergize the Haitian National Police’s capacity to fight the gangs that operate with impunity in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The mission never deployed to its full 2,500–3,000 force, and it has operated under a shaky multilateral funding structure. Yet, for all of its failings, the MSS remains the main instrument to address Haiti’s expanding gang violence. The Biden administration was actively exploring transitioning the MSS to a formal UN peacekeeping operation, an approach that would provide more structured and predictable budgetary and operational advantages. The White House’s guarded outlook toward multilateralism raises questions about such an approach and the viability of a successful effort in the UN Security Council (UNSC). All of this may be a moot point to the degree that the UNSC’s own Haiti recommendations to the UNSC do not contain a formal peacekeeping deployment. However, an alternative U.S. multilateral security strategy may be under consideration through the Organization of American States (OAS), which would boost the administration’s imperative that Haiti is a regional concern. This would emerge as a new OAS secretary general (Albert Ramdin) comes into office, facing an otherwise uncertain U.S. funding future for the organization. One can discern two variations to the above scenarios, neither encouraging. One envisions the United States muddling through, regardless of the deepening humanitarian reality in Haiti, hoping that Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) holds, and border tensions with the Dominican Republic do not worsen. A more dramatic alternative envisions the United States focusing all its attention on a mitigation strategy, essentially a maritime and air surveillance barrier designed to prevent Haitian migration. Aside from taxing U.S. Coast Guard and other U.S. assets, this scenario may be outflanked by trouble at the Haiti-Dominican border, let alone being at the mercy of the region’s hurricane season and other natural disasters.
Q3: What principles guide U.S. policy thinking?
A3: There appear to be three guiding principles: First, the idea that U.S. leadership on Haiti does not imply U.S. boots on the ground or the direct engagement of U.S. military forces. Second, the crisis in Haiti must be perceived as a hemispheric responsibility to address, not just a U.S. concern. This underscores U.S. expectations of direct involvement by other hemispheric partners.
A third guiding principle may be the most important: a U.S. policy framed as much by foreign and security concerns as by U.S. domestic policy considerations. The latter highlights the importance of immigration and drug trafficking concerns. This envisions viewing solutions to Haiti’s security crisis as part of how U.S. priorities regarding immigration and drug trafficking are addressed. This does entail some buy-in and policy coordination from Haiti’s Caribbean neighbors.
Q4: Is Haiti’s crisis primarily a security issue?
A4: No—although, understandably, much of the attention over the past two years has focused on the dramatic rise in street violence, kidnappings, and generalized insecurity. This has paralyzed much of Haiti’s economic and social life, including its already stretched medical facilities and even battle-hardened international aid groups. Much of the employment and tax-generating sector is shut down.
The more alarming element emerging over the past year includes the expansion of violent zones beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince, and an increasingly more coordinated set of gang coalitions (led by Viv Ansamn: “living together”) targeting entire neighborhoods, small towns, and governmental institutions. An estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince is under some gang control, the southwestern peninsula of Haiti is essentially cut off, gangs control roads from Port-au-Prince towards the Dominican border, and are expanding a wave of mayhem into the north central Artibonite region of Haiti. At the human level, Haiti has become a country of displaced people fleeing violence, in tandem with growing acute food insecurity and hunger.
Countering this violence is an understaffed and under-resourced Haitian National Police, as well as a primarily Kenyan MSS deployment that is no match for the evolving battlefield environment. Worse, the depth of Haiti’s crisis emerges even more strikingly when also evaluating the state of political governance. This becomes important to the degree that the international community’s response, including the United States, has presumed the existence of a viable Haitian governmental partner.
Q5: What is the status of Haiti’s government?
A5: The TPC was set up in April 2024 with direct support from the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the United States. Coming in the wake of the July 2021 assassination of Haiti’s last president, and the total absence of any elected official at both national and local levels, this is a politically wobbly structure. Of the three tasks the TPC identified as priorities—constitutional reform and referendum, national elections, and a national security plan—little progress has been achieved on any of them.
The constitutional reform process involves an update of the 1987 constitution, a review process whose work has arguably already been mostly achieved through Haitian efforts and support from international donors. The problem now is operationalizing this into a credible referendum process. The original date for this was this spring, which has been postponed to this summer. At the same time, a national election remains on the calendar for later this fall, even though all observers agree that this is an unrealistic timetable. The timetable is politically significant, however, since it is linked to the April 2024 agreement that created the TPC, and has a specific sunset date of February 7, 2026, when the process is supposed to conclude with the emergence of an elected president and National Assembly.
The international community must avoid a scenario in which the TPC suddenly collapses. The fall of Port-au-Prince to increasingly determined gang coalitions and a deepening humanitarian crisis is not wild speculation. Then what? There are severe pressures within Haiti’s fractured political scene to replace what has been, admittedly, a poorly performing transitional governance structure. This might strengthen the argument that what Haiti needs is an iron-fisted presidential leadership. This has its adherents in Haiti and could find receptive ears elsewhere in the region and in Washington. But with no viable governmental and security capacity in place to impose such a strategy, and a civil society operating on life support, this likely condemns Haiti to an even more uncertain future.
Q6: What are the U.S. options to address Haiti’s crisis?
A6: Because some of the Haiti-related know-how may have been downgraded by the dismemberment of United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s funding capacity and the related uncertain Department of State reorganization, the way that U.S. policymakers deploy resources to address Haiti’s crisis will shape the TPC’s ability to address its third task—a national security plan. The outlook remains murky. The collapse of USAID’s funding capacity and ambiguous Department of State reforms leave key democracy and governance programming support in limbo. Some of this is also caught up in the broader contours of U.S. diplomacy toward the United Nations, the OAS, and U.S.–Western Hemisphere relations generally. Nonetheless, assuming the administration’s determination of no deployment of U.S. boots in Haiti, what are preferable policy alternatives than allowing Haiti to blow up?
The White House can ensure that appropriate staffing at the National Security Council with regard to Haiti is filled. The same applies to the Department of State’s Office of Caribbean Affairs, with expertise that combines functional and regional or country experience.
S. Southern Command’s superb planning capacity should be activated to sketch out specific operational scenarios and identify accessible U.S. and international and multilateral resources—in effect, gaming out possible implementation strategies, some of which likely already exist. This initially entails determining clearly the U.S. posture regarding the MSS. Likewise, discussions with Haitian authorities need to clarify the potential, let alone the politics of a reconstituted Haitian army (FadH—Forces Armées d'Haïti) as an indigenous military component (presently a force of about 2,500) to address the country’s insecurity.
S. policy labeling cartels as terrorist organizations is focused on Mexico and Central America. But operationalizing such a strategy towards Haiti is emerging with the administration’s designation of Viv Ansanm (a coalition of the G-9 and G-Pép gangs operating in Port-au-Prince) and Gran Grif (notoriously, a violent gang operating in the Artibonite region) as both foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global terrorists. The focus on Haiti could enable an anti-cartel and gang strategy to be downsized to a practical operational scale. In tandem, one can envision managing the “no U.S. boots on the ground” principle with a short-term rotation strategy of specialized U.S. security capabilities into Haiti, mixed with private contractor options, and complementary other assets from the hemisphere.
Action is required regarding arms trafficking flows into the Caribbean, particularly Haiti, much of it originating from the United States. The United States is coming under increasing political and legal pressure from the Caribbean, Mexico, and others. These criminal trafficking flows must be viewed as a U.S. national security priority.
Even if Haitian migrants’ Temporary Protective Status is not reinstated (although that would be preferable), the administration should call off any potential deportations back to Haiti. The notion of deporting human beings to a country with full violence is not politically viable.
There are also U.S. development tools for the “day-after” rebuilding scenarios that need to be energized with congressional action. This includes the Global Fragility Act (GFA), of which Haiti is a potential beneficiary, and which first emerged during the first Trump administration. The Act was reintroduced in April in a bipartisan manner in the House of Representatives. And even though the climate for trade with Haiti has shrunk because of the insecurity, the HOPE (Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity for Partnership Encouragement) and HELP (Haiti Economic Lift Program) preferential trade legislation needs to be renewed before September. Action now towards GFA and HOPE/HELP underscores the need to preserve what is left of Haiti’s economic and civil society institutions, without which rebuilding efforts will be even more costly.
Finally, building on Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s April Caribbean visit, formalize a U.S.-CARICOM policy anchored by mutual strategic interests. This includes the southern Caribbean’s fossil fuel energy belt, management of the crisis with Venezuela, climate change transition technologies, and the practical reality that CARICOM also owns the Haitian crisis. Measurable success in this regional arena would, in turn, benefit U.S.–Latin American policy.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-united-states-cant-afford-ignore-haitis-collapse-key-questions
Transnational Gangs Are Just a Prop in Trump’s ‘Deportation Theater’
James Bosworth, World Policy Review
Designating a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, or FTO, was once an important and significant measure for the United States government. After more than 3,000 lives were lost in the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Washington’s most visible response was to send troops into Afghanistan and Iraq, while using drones to hunt terrorists throughout the Middle East and Africa, and providing military training, equipment and intelligence to other countries globally to target terrorists. More quietly, and perhaps more effectively, the Justice Department went after anyone who financed or assisted groups on a rapidly growing FTO list. To some extent, and with plenty of disagreements along the way, that list was replicated by the European Union, the United Nations and others, and then used as a legal justification to target terrorists around the world. There are plenty of arguments that some or all of the strategies the U.S. employed in its so-called Global War on Terrorism were not ideal and even counterproductive. But nobody can deny that the U.S. spent significant time and resources as it focused on the terrorism threat.
In contrast, after his inauguration for a second nonconsecutive term in January, U.S. President Donald Trump’s counterterrorism strategy has consisted more of rhetoric than of action. Even as the administration has expanded the definition of terrorism to include transnational violent gangs, few resources have been expended to actually challenge those groups and treat them as a national security threat. Instead, the designations have been used as domestic political fodder to justify Trump’s mass deportation campaign, even as the U.S. has cut foreign aid and its overseas presence.
Since Trump took office, his administration has designated 11 new groups as FTOs, 10 of them in the Western Hemisphere. Implementing an executive order that Trump issued in the first week of his new presidency, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated six Mexican cartels as well as the Salvadoran gang MS-13 and the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, or TdA, as FTOs on Feb. 20. Last week, the administration added two Haitian gangs, Gran Grif and Viv Ansanm, to the list. So far, Washington has not accompanied the designations with much international follow-up. Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have hinted at the possibility of U.S. military operations against the Mexican cartels within Mexico, but they have yet to act. While unilateral drone strikes may take out some high-value targets or several fentanyl labs, that would represent at best a symbolic victory rather than a real strategy. In the long-term, however, it would be counterproductive, as it would anger the Mexican government, which has rejected any possibility of U.S. forces operating in its territory, in a way that would likely reduce ongoing cooperation, while potentially provoking the cartels to retaliate and doing little to help improve security within Mexico.
Nor has Trump acted against MS-13. In fact, his administration has eagerly cooperated with Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, whose negotiations with MS-13 and other Salvadoran gangs have been part of his political strategy since the time he was mayor of San Salvador. Last week, for instance, the Salvadoran daily El Faro published interviews with gang members about Bukele’s negotiations with the leaders of Barrio 18—MS-13’s rival—from that time. Upon subsequently becoming president, Bukele, like his predecessors, continued to negotiate backchannel deals with MS-13. That resulted in the release of various gang leaders several years ago in return for pledges to reduce violence, even as Bukele began to launch his high-profile “war on gangs.” Trump did Bukele the favor of deporting those leaders back to El Salvador before they could testify in U.S. criminal proceedings against them about their relationship with the Salvadoran president.
This underscores one of the most important pieces that is missing in the Trump administration’s strategy of designating transnational gangs as terrorists: a consistent application of both the law and the broader policy. Similarly, Trump hasn’t acted against Tren de Aragua. His administration has used the purported threat posed by TdA as a justification for invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, which allows the government to expel citizens of a foreign power during times of war. Despite an assessment by the U.S. intelligence community to the contrary, Trump maintains that the TdA is launching an “invasion” of the U.S. under the direction of the Venezuelan government, and he is using that unsubstantiated accusation to claim increased authority to detain and deport Venezuelan migrants. But this “deportation theater” has not been accompanied by action against TdA’s actual leadership structures and finances around the hemisphere.
With regard to Haiti, the Trump administration has cut aid funding to the Haitian government and is looking to scale back its financial support for a multilateral security support mission currently deployed there. That is hardly an approach commensurate with the concern that Haitian gangs are terrorists representing serious security threats. As with MS-13, the Miami Herald reports that the designation of these Haitian gangs as terrorists is likely about supporting Trump’s deportation agenda, rather than a security-focused policy.
The only exception to the Trump administration’s record of inaction against FTO-listed groups has been with regard to Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have been attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea and launching missiles at Israel since the beginning of the war in Gaza. For the past few months, the Trump administration has been engaged in a bombing campaign against the group in an effort to secure the busy maritime artery. However, just weeks after re-designating the Houthis as a terrorist organization, Trump announced a truce, bringing the airstrikes to an abrupt end.
This raises important strategic questions about whether the Trump administration is open to negotiating with terrorists now, and if so, whether the Mexican cartels and TdA might cut a similar deal. Trump’s recent pattern of flip-flopping on tariffs is a chaotic strategy that may improve or worsen the U.S. position in trade negotiations. But flip-flopping on defeating a terrorist group can put national security at risk.
So, what is the Trump administration’s counterterrorism strategy? Perhaps even engaging in this debate is a form of “sane-washing,” a term Trump’s critics use to describe the process whereby outside analysts seek to rationally evaluate what is likely just a stupid or cruel policy the U.S. president has not really thought through. The administration’s counterterrorism approach appears to be a policy designed for domestic consumption rather than international effect. Additionally, it’s likely a positive sign that Trump is not pursuing these groups with the level of effort of a full “global war on terrorism,” given all the negative second-order consequences of that kind of military involvement.
However, whether or not the terrorism designation is justified, these groups are a security threat. So the discussion of what should be done to counter them is worth having. In theory, the designation of Mexican cartels and Haitian gangs as terrorist organizations should trigger investigations and actions to stop the massive flow of U.S. weapons overseas. Approximately 70 percent of firearms recovered at Mexican crime scenes originate in the United States, and the Caribbean is also awash in illegally trafficked U.S. weapons. If the cartels and gangs are terrorist organizations, then the U.S. firearms dealers, gun shops and straw purchasers who supply them are providing material support to terrorists. That’s a serious federal offense that carries lengthy prison sentences. And yet, for political reasons, the Trump administration is unlikely to do anything to prosecute these or any other groups that are part of its support base.
Beyond firearms, there would also be more intelligence-sharing with regional governments, accompanied by increased aid to address the root causes of instability and efforts to target the listed groups’ financial networks. While there has been some additional intelligence-sharing with Mexico, the rest of the potential support hasn’t increased. In fact, it’s been cut. This underscores one of the most important pieces that is missing in the administration’s strategy of designating these groups as FTOs: a consistent application of both the law and the broader policy. In the past, one strength of the terrorist designation has been that private sector companies fear investigation and prosecution for working with the groups on the list. Unfortunately, given the politicized nature of the Trump administration’s actions, it’s less clear whether and how it will follow through on any of these designations. Worse, it is not clear if it will attack the terrorist groups or negotiate with them. And administration officials have given the impression they will remain friendly with leaders like Bukele and even shake hands with Maduro, despite evidence or credible claims of ties to the groups now designated as terrorists. Finally, designating the Haitian gangs as terrorists while abandoning support for the country and its security forces is illogical and exacerbates a growing risk of instability for the hemisphere.
Whether dealing with terrorism, drug trafficking, corruption or sanctions, simply putting names on a list is not a national security strategy. And in the fight against terrorists, it’s never a good idea to politicize the issue when it hurts political opponents and turn a blind eye when allies break the rules. Whether in counterterrorism or foreign policy more generally, those are the kinds of approaches that come back to haunt governments later. As a result, when the next U.S. administration inherits Trump’s terrorism list, it will need to think deeply about what strategies are needed to combat these groups. It is possible that the list itself will need an overhaul after four years in which we will likely see many more flip-flops and domestically focused initiatives that leave real security challenges unaddressed. James Bosworth is the founder of Hxagon, a firm that does political risk analysis and bespoke research in emerging and frontier markets, as well as a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Latin America Program. He has two decades of experience analyzing politics, economics and security in Latin America and the Caribbean. worldpoliticsreview.com